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1. INTRODUCTION
We consider a risk-sensitive optimal control problem for hidden Markov models
(HMM), i.e., controlled Markov chains where state information is only available to
the controller via an output (message) process. The optimal control of HMM under
standard, risk-neutral performance criteria, e.g., discounted and average costs, has
received much attention in the past. Many basic results and numerous applications
have been reported in the literature in this subject; see [ABFGM], [BE2], [KV],
and references therein. Controlled Markov chains with full state information and a
risk-sensitive performance criterion have also received some attention, dating back
at least to the work of Howard and Matheson [HOM]; see also [BSO], [CSO].
On the other hand, quite the opposite is the situation for HMM under risk-
sensitive criteria, e.g., expected value of the exponential of additive costs. Whittle
and others (see [WHI] and references therein) have extensively studied the risk-
sensitive optimal control of partially-observable linear exponential quadratic Gaus-
sian (LEQG) systems; see also [BVS]. More recently, James, Baras and Elliott [JBE],
[BJ], have treated the risk-sensitive partially-observable optimal control problem of
discrete-time non-linear systems.
The paucity of results in this subject area can be mostly attributed to the lack in
the past of appropriate sucient statistics, or information states. As is well known,
if the cost criterion being considered is of the type \expected value of additive
costs," then the posterior probability density, given all available information up
to the present, constitutes a sucient statistic for control (or information state);
see [ABFGM], [BE2], [KV]. The latter result was originally proved by Shiryaev in
the early sixties [SHI1]-[SHI2], who also proved that this was not the case for non-
additive cost criteria [SHI3]. In particular, the posterior probability density is not a
sucient statistic for HMM under an \exponential of sum of costs" type of criterion,
which is non-additive. This fact was overlooked in [GHE], thus invalidating the
claims of optimality for the policies obtained in that paper. {
{ Certainly, one can pose a well dened stochastic optimal control problem given
any statistic. However, if the chosen statistic is not sucient, then one cannot hope
to obtain the \overall" optimal policy, except by serendipity.
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Recently, James, Baras, and Elliott [BJ], [JBE] have derived information states
for HMM under an \exponential of additive costs" criterion, and have also given
dynamic programming equations from which optimal values and controls can be
computed, for problems with a nite horizon. Building upon the results by Baras,
James and Elliott, we report in this paper results of an investigation on the nature
and structure of risk-sensitive controllers. We pose the following question:
How does risk-sensitivity manifest itself
in the structure of a controller?
Whittle [WHI] has addressed a similar question for the LEQG problem, and
he has shown that much insight can be gained from a comparison of the risk-
neutral (i.e., the classical LQG) and risk-sensitive equations describing the optimal
controller. In our context, one diculty encountered is that optimal controllers are
dened in terms of dierent information states for the risk-neutral and risk sensitive
cases; see also [BJ], [JBE].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes some basic results
about utility and risk theory. In section 3 we present our model, and recall the
main results on information states from [BJ]-[JBE] that will be needed for our
developments. Section 4 contains several general results, and in section 5 we present
a particular case study of a popular benchmark problem. We obtain structural
results for the optimal risk-sensitive controller, and compare it to that of the risk-
neutral case. Furthermore, we show that indeed the risk-sensitive controller and its
corresponding information state converge to the known solutions for the risk-neutral
situation, as the risk factor goes to zero. We also study the innite and general risk
aversion cases.
2. RATIONAL PREFERENCES, UTILITY AND RISK
Consider the situation where a decision maker (DM) is faced with several
choices, the outcomes of which are uncertain. That is, the DM can choose among
several gambles or lotteries  2 , and the consequent reward R for the lottery is a
random variable, with a known probability distribution P. With no loss of gener-
ality for our purposes, we may associate P with the lottery itself. Utility theory,
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as developed by von Neuman and Morgenstern (vNM), see [BE1], [LR], tries to
quantitatively describe the preferences of the DM, under the assumption that these
are rational, in the following sense. Let P1 and P2 be two of the choices available
to the DM, and suppose that he always prefers P1 over P2 . Then, (vNM) assume
that there exists a complete and transitive relation \" on the set of lotteries such
that
P1  P2 : (2:1)
Under some \continuity" condition for the relation \" (see [BE1], [LR, p. 27]) it
can be shown that:
(i) there exists a real-valued utility function U : IR! IR such that
P1  P2 () IE1fU(R)g  IE2fU(R)g (2:2);
(ii) U() is unique, up to an ane transformation of the form U()+; with  > 0
and  2 IR.
Let R := IE
fRg, which is sometimes called the \actuarial value" of the
lottery  [PT]. Note that if the DM's utility function is ane, then his preferences
only depend on the expected values of R. Thus, he would then be indierent as
to whether to keep the lottery P (i.e., proceed with the gamble) or avoid it and
instead be compensated with the quantity R, i.e., IE
fU(R)g = U(R). In this
situation the DM is said to be risk neutral. On the other hand, the DM may prefer
certainty over the uncertain lottery, i.e., he may be risk averse or pessimistic;
in this case we have that:
IEfU(R)g  U(R): (2:3)
Notice that (2.3) implies in general that U() is a concave function. Conversely, if
IEfU(R)g  U(R); (2:4)
which implies in general that U() is convex, the DM is said to be risk seeking or
optimistic.
Note that the characterization given by (2.3)-(2.4) is not enough to measure
the DM's sensitivity to risk. Pratt [PT] introduced a measure of risk that has
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been widely accepted, see also [BE1]. First, dene the risk premium p as the
quantity the DM is willing to pay in order to avoid the lottery, and instead receive
its actuarial value, that is:
U(R   p) = IE
fU(R)g: (2:5)
Now, following [PT] (see also [BE1]), proceeding formally we have that
U(R   p) = U(R)  pU
0(R) + o[p]; (2:6)
where o[]=! 0, as ! 0. Also















where 2 denotes the variance of R with respect to P







00(R) + o[p] + IE
fo[(R R)
2]g: (2:8)
Therefore, we see from (2.8) that the risk premium is proportional, up to rst order
(i.e. locally), to the variance of the reward, and the proportionality factor is one








Notice that if r() > 0 then the DM is risk averse, and risk seeking in the converse.
Furthermore, if r(z) = 0, then the DM is risk neutral, i.e., his utility function
is ane, and thus his preferences depend only on the actuarial (expected) values
of the lotteries. The latter is the most common case (implicitly) studied in the
literature, where expected values of rewards are maximized; see [ABFGM], [BE2],
[KV].
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2.1 CONSTANT RISK AVERSION
In many situations it is to be expected that the DM has either a decreasing
or increasing risk aversion coecient r(), as a function of the DM's wealth. For
example, it is to be expected that a portfolio manager may be more reticent to risk
half his assets if the value of the portfolio is a billion dollars, than if it is $10; 000;
see [BE2] for a very nice presentation of problems of this nature. On the other
hand, if r() = constant, then the DM's sensitivity to risk does not depend on the
level of his current wealth. To gain more insight into this situation, consider the
certainty equivalent for a lottery P, denoted by c 2 IR and dened by:
IEfU(R)g = U(c): (2:10)
Then, if the DM has constant risk aversion, his utility function must satisfy the so
called \ property": if R is increased by a quantity  2 IR, then one has that the
certainty equivalent is increased by the same amount [HOM]. From (2.9), it is seen
that if r() =  2 IR, then one has that the utility function for the DM must take
one of the following forms (up to an ane transformation):
r() =  =)
8>>><
>>>:
U(z) = z;  = 0;
U(z) =  exp( z);  > 0;
U(z) = exp( z);  < 0.
(2:11)
In the sequel, we will be concerned with negative net benets, i.e., costs, instead
of rewards, and thus we will seek to minimize disutilities instead of maximizing utili-
ties. Hence, correspondingly the following disutility function L() will be considered,
for  2 IR,  6= 0:
L(c) := sgn()exp(  c); (2:12)
where sgn() denotes the sign of .
{6{
3. THE CONTROLLED HIDDEN MARKOV MODEL
A controlled hidden Markov model is given by a ve-tuple hX;Y;U; fP (u) : u 2
Ug; fQ(u) : u 2 Ugi; here X = f1; 2; : : : ; NXg is the nite set of (internal) states,
Y = f1; 2; : : : ; NYg is the set of observations (or messages), U = f1; 2; : : : ; NUg








is the NX  NY
state/message matrix, i.e., qx;y(u) is the probability of receiving message y when
the state is x and action u has been selected. In the operations research literature
similar models are called partially observable Markov decision processes [FAM1],
[FAM2], and in the computer science literature nite state stochastic automata
[DOB], [PAZ]. Two types of information patterns are of interest.
Information Pattern 1 (IP1):
At decision epoch t, the system is in the (unobservable) state Xt = i, a decision
Ut = u is taken, and the state evolves to Xt+1 = j with probability pi;j(u).
Once the state has evolved to Xt+1, an observation Yt+1 is gathered, such that:
ProbfYt+1 = y j Xt+1 = i; Ut = ug = qx;y(u): (3:1:a)
Hence, based on I
(1)
t := (Y0; U0; Y1; : : : ; Ut; Yt+1), a new decision Ut+1 is se-
lected.
Information Pattern 2 (IP2):
At decision epoch t, the system is in the (unobservable) state Xt = i, a decision
Ut = u is taken, and an observation Yt+1 is gathered, such that:
ProbfYt+1 = y j Xt = i; Ut = ug = qi;y(u): (3:1:b)
The state then evolves to Xt+1 = j with probability pi;j(u). Hence, based on
I
(2)
t := (U0; Y1; U1; Y2; : : : ; Ut; Yt+1), a new decision Ut+1 is selected.
Hereafter we will simply write It and Yt for a generic information pattern and the
ltration generated by the available observations, respectively, up to decision epoch
t.
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Given an expected cost per stage (i; u) 7! c(i; u), the sum of costs for the nite





The risk-sensitive optimal control problem is that of nding a control policy  =









where  6= 0 is the risk-factor, and sgn() is the sign of ; here IE denotes the
expectation induced by policy  and, implicitly, the initial distribution of the state.
By computing the Taylor series expansion of J(), when  is suciently small, the
risk sensitivity of the above criterion becomes evident in that, in addition to the
standard expected sum of costs, a second order term in the expansion measures the
variance of CM ; see [WHI] for details. If  > 0, then the controller is risk-averse or
pessimistic, whereas if  < 0 then the controller is risk-prefering or optimistic.
3.1 INFORMATION STATES
As for the risk-neutral case [ABFGM], [BE], [KV], an equivalent stochastic
optimal control problem can be formulated in terms of information states and sepa-
rated policies. Here we follow the work of Baras, Elliott, and James [BJ]-[JBE], who
derived information states both for problems with continuous [JBE] and discrete
[BJ] state variables. First, we equivalently reformulate the stochastic control prob-
lem in terms of a canonical measure, as follows. Let Yt be the ltration generated
by the available observations up to decision epoch t, and let Gt be the ltration
generated by the sequence of states and observations up to that time as given by
(IP). Then the probability measure induced by a policy  is equivalent to a canon-
ical distribution Py, under which fYtg is independently and identically distributed
(i.i.d), uniformly distributed, independent of fXtg, and fXtg is a controlled Markov













tk=1qXk;Yk(Uk 1); Gt generated by (IP1);
N t
Y
tk=1qXk 1;Yk(Uk 1); Gt generated by (IP2).
(3:5)














Following [BJ], [EM] and [JBE], the information state for our problem is given by







 t j Yt

; (3:7)
where 1[A] is the indicator function of the event A, and 0 (i) = p0, where p0





 2 IRNX j (i)  0; 8i
	
. With this denition of information
state, similar results as in the risk-neutral case can be obtained. In particular,
one obtains a recursive updating formula for ft g, which is driven by the output
(observation) path and evolves forward in time. Moreover, the value functions can
be expressed in terms of the information state only, and dynamic programming
equations give necessary and sucient optimality conditions for separated policies,
i.e., maps t 7! ~t(








where fMg is obtained from (3.5) under the action of policy . Hence, the original
partially observed problem is equivalently expressed as one with complete state
information, i.e., ft g. For ease of presentation, we consider hereafter the risk-
averse case only ( > 0); the risk-seeking case is treated similarly.
4. GENERAL RESULTS
As in the completely observed case [HOM], dene the disutility contribution
matrix as x:
[D(u)]i;j := pi;j(u)  exp(c(i; u)): (4:1)
x Notice that we are using expected one-stage cost functions. If on the other
hand a model using one-stage cost functions that depend explicitly on the current
and next state, e.g, c(i; j; u) is used, then (4.1) is modied accordingly.
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The following lemma gives the recursions that govern the evolution of the informa-
tion state.





T (Ut)  

t ; Yt generated by (IP1);
NY  D
T (Ut)Q(Yt+1; Ut)  

t ; Yt generated by (IP2);
(4:2)
where Q(y; u) := diag(qi;y)(u), and A
T denotes the transpose of the matrix A.
Proof: Following [JBE], [BJ], we have that the operator governing the evolution
of the information state is the matrix with (i; j) element given by NY  pi;j(u) 
exp(c(i; u))qi;y(u), where u denotes the decision taken at decision epoch t, and y
denotes the value of the most recent observation gathered by decision epoch t+ 1.
Then (4.2) follows straightforwardly. ut
Remark 4.1: The NY factor appears in (4.2) due to the use of the canonical
measure Py; see (3.5).
Remark 4.2: For risk-sensitive completely observed controlled Markov chains with
nite state and control sets, it is well known that the disutility matrix D(u) governs
the evolution of the disutility [HOM], [JAQ]. On the other hand, for risk-neutral
HMM models, the information state used is the conditional probability distribu-
tion of the (unobservable) state, given the available observations [ABFGM], [BE2],
[KV]. The unnormalized form of this conditional probability distribution is given
by similar recursions as in (4.2), with D(u) replaced by P (u). Moreover, observe
that as  ! 0, D(u) ! P (u) (elementwise). Therefore, we see that (4.2) is the
\natural" extrapolation of the standard risk-neutral information state.
As in [BJ], [JBE], dene value functions J(;M k) : IRNX+ ! IR, k = 1; : : : ;M ,
as follows:











For ease of presentation, we will hereafter consider exclusively (IP1). Simple mod-
ications to the results in the sequel give the corresponding results for (IP2). Fur-
thermore, we will denote by T (u; y) the matrix
T (u; y) := NY Q(y; u)D
T (u): (4:4)
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The next result follows directly from [BJ], [JBE].
Lemma 4.2: The dynamic programming equations for the value functions in this










J(T (u; YM k+1)  ;M   k + 1)
	
k = 1; 2; : : : ;M .
(4:5)
Furthermore, a separated policy  = f0 ; : : : ; 

M 1g that attains the minimum in
(4.5) is risk-sensitive optimal.
Recall that IEy[] is the expectation with respect to the canonical measure Py,














Next, we present several general results for the risk-sensitive case that have similar
counterparts in the standard risk-neutral case [ABFGM], [BE2], [FAM1], [KV],
[SSO].
Lemma 4.3: The value functions given by (4.5) are concave functions of  2 IRNX+ .
Proof:
We proceed by induction in k, with the case k = 0 being trivially veried from
(4.5). Assume that the claim holds true for 0  k = k  1 < M . Let 0    1 and
1; 2 2 IR
NX
+ , and dene ~ := 1 + (1  )2. Then we have that:















J(T (u; y)  1;M   k + 1)
+ (1  )J(T (u; y)  2;M   k + 1)
o




where the rst inequality follows due to the induction hypothesis, and the second
inequality due to (4.5). ut
Remark 4.3: For the risk-neutral case, a similar result was initially pointed out by
Shiryaev [SHI1]-[SHI2], and shown in detail by Astrom [AST], for normalized infor-
mation states. This result has been fundamental in showing optimality of structured
policies in the risk-neutral case; see [FAM1], [LOV], [WCC], and references therein.
Next, dene recursively sets of vectors in IRNX+ as follows:










Note that the cardinality of the sets dened in (4.8) obeys the recursion jAkj 
jAk 1j
NY  NU. In the risk-neutral case, the counterpart of the following result
has been shown to have important computational implications [ABFGM], [FAM1],
[SSO]. It will play a key role in our subsequent developments.
Lemma 4.4: The value functions given by (4.5) are piecewise linear functions in
 2 IRNX+ , such that:







We proceed by induction in k, with the case k = 0 being trivially veried from
(4.5). Assume that the claim holds true for 0  overlinek = k  1 < M , then from
(4.5) above we have:




























where ~(u; y; ) 2 Ak 1 denotes a minimizer in the expression on the right of the
rst equality above. The last equality follows since   T (u; y)   > ~(u; y; ) 




Lemma 4.5: Optimal separated policies ft g are constant along rays through the
origin, i.e., let  2 IRNX+ then 

t (
0) = t (), for all 
0 = ,   0.
Proof:
>From Lemma 4.4 we see that J(0;M   k) = J(;M   k). Hence, the
result follows from Lemma 4.2. ut
Denition 4.1: From (4.5) and (4.6), for u 2 U and k = 1; 2; : : : ;M , let
Ju (;M   k) := IE
y













The control region CRku  IR
NX




 j  2 IRNX+ ; J
(;M   k) = Ju (;M   k)
	
: (4:12:a)
Furthermore by Lemma 4.2 if M k is an optimal separated policy for stage M   k
then, for u 2 U,




M k() = ug: (4:12:b)
Denition 4.2: An action u 2 U is said to be a resetting action if there exists
j 2 X such that pi;j(u) = 1, for all i 2 X. Therefore from (4.1)-(4.2) and (4.4)
we note that, for any  2 IRNX+ and y 2 Y,




exp(c(`; u))  (`)

 j ; (4:13)
where 1 = (1; 0; 0; : : : ; 0)
T , 2 = (0; 1; 0; : : : ; 0)
T , ..., NX = (0; 0; 0; : : : ; 1)
T . We
further denote








Theorem 4.1: Let u 2 U be a resetting action. Then CRku, is a convex subset of
IRNX+ .
Proof:
Recall from Lemma 4.3 that the optimal cost-to-go functions J(;M   k) are
concave. Since the maps T (u; y) in (4.4) are linear then Ju (;M   k) are also
concave, for all u 2 U. Furthermore, IRNX+ is a convex domain. Then, by Lemma
1 in [LOV] we have that: if Ju (;M   k) is a linear function in IR
NX
+ , then CR
k
u is
convex. Thus all that remains to be proven is the linearity of Ju (;M   k).
Let  2 IRNX+ , we have by (4.2), (4.4), Denitions 4.1-4.2, and Lemma 4.4 that:








  T (u; y)
	

















Hence, since by (4.14) (; u) is linear in IRNX+ , so is J

u (;M   k). ut
5. A CASE STUDY
We consider a popular benchmark problem for which much is known in the risk-
neutral case. This is a two-state replacement problem which models failure-prone
units in production/manufacturing systems, communication systems, etc. The un-
derlying state of the unit can either be working (Xt = 0) or failed (Xt = 1), and
the available actions are to keep (Ut = 0) the current unit or replace (Ut = 1) the
unit by a new one. The cost function (x; u) 7! c(x; u) is as follows: let R > C > 0,
then c(0; 0) = 0, c(1; 0) = C, c(x; 1) = R. The messages received have probability
1=2 < q < 1 of coinciding with the true state of the unit. The state transition













with 0 <  < 1; see [WCC], [FAM1], [FAM2] for more details. With the above
denitions, the matrices used to update the information state vector are given by:
T (0; y) = 2

qy(1  ) 0













where qy := q(1  y) + (1  q)y, y = 0; 1.
For this case  = ((1); (2))T 2 IR2+, and the dynamic programming recur-
sions (4.5) take the form:
8<
:
J(;M) = (1) + (2);
J(;M   k) = min

J0 (;M   k); J





Dene the replace control region CRkreplace and the keep control region CR
k
keep
in the obvious manner, c.f. Denition 4.1.
Lemma 5.1. For all decision epochs the replace control region is a (possibly empty)
conic segment in IR2+.
Proof:
>From (5.1) the replace action resets the system to the working state. Then
the result follows immediately from Lemma 4.5 and Theorem 4.1. ut
The next result establishes an important threshold structural property of the
optimal control policy. This is similar to well known results for the risk neutral case
[FAM1], [FAM2], [LOV], [WCC].
Theorem 5.1. If CRkreplace is nonempty, then it includes the (2)-axis, i.e., IR
2
+ is
partitioned by a line through the origin such that for values of  2 IR2+ above the
line it is optimal to replace the unit, and it is optimal to keep the unit otherwise.
Proof:
We proceed to show that if it is optimal to keep the unit in the (2)-axis (see
Lemma 4.5), then the optimal policy is to keep the unit for all values of  2 IR2+.
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Hence, by contradiction, we can then conclude from Lemma 5.1 that if CRkreplace
is nonempty, then it must include the (2)-axis, and the statement of the theorem
then follows.
Let 0 = (0; (2))T , (2) > 0. Then, for 0 < k M , we have from (5.2), (5.3),
and Lemma 4.4 that:
J0 (
0;M   k) = eC(2)(2);
J1 (
0;M   k) = eR(2)(1);
where (i) denotes the componentwise minimum over Ak 1. Suppose that
J0 (
0;M   k) < J1 (
0;M   k)
() eC(2) < eR(1):
(5:4)
Now, for any other  2 IR2+,














Since  > 0 and R > C > 0, then














Now, dene ~Ak 1  Ak 1 as:
~Ak 1 :=
n





which is nonempty by (5.4). Then by minimizing over ~Ak 1 the terms on the right
hand side in (5.6) we obtain an upper-bound for this expression, and we nally get
that:
J0 (;M   k) < e
R(1)(1) + eR(2)(1) = J1 (;M   k);
and therefore it is optimal to keep the unit at all  2 IR2+. ut
Using the dynamic programming recursions (5.3), the structure of optimal poli-
cies can be further elucidated. First we need a simple technical result, the proof of
which is presented in the Appendix. Dene:
0 := 1;
1 := 1 = (1  )0 + e
0C ;
...
k+1 := (1  )k + e
kC ; k = 0; 1; : : : ;M:
(5:8)
Lemma 5.2: k+1 > k, and e
Rk > k+1; k = 1; 2; : : : ;M .
The following theorem gives more precise results on the structure of optimal
policies, and its proof is presented in the Appendix.
Theorem 5.2: Let 0 < K M be given.
(i) The necessary and sucient condition for the policy with M 1() = : : : =

M K












(ii) If (5.9) holds, then:
J(;M  K) = J0 (;M  K) = K(1) + e
KC(2);








(iii) If 1  K M is the smallest integer for which (5.9) fails to hold, then 
M K
()





(1) = (2); (5:11)
such that the region to the left (above) the line is the replace control region.
Remark 5.1. Note that the simplest nontrivial decision process corresponds to the
case M = 2, since (5.9) is always satised for K = 1.
5.1. SMALL AND LARGE RISK LIMITS
In order to build a better understanding as to how risk sensitivity manifests
itself in the structure of the optimal control strategies, we analyze both the small
risk sensitivity limiting case ( ! 0) and the innite risk aversion case ( ! 1).
First, we give some insight on conditions (5.9).
Remark 5.2. Let K be a positive integer. Then if R  KC, we have that
sgn()eR  sgn()eKC ;
and hence the DM would never prefer to replace the unit, at any point within the
last K stages. Therefore, R  KC is a sucient condition for the optimal policy
to be M k() = 0, 8 2 IR

+, k = 1; 2; : : : ;M  K, i.e., it is optimal to keep the
unit for the last K stages; c.f. (5.9).
Innite Risk Aversion Case ( !1).
Consider the situation  !1 in (5.8). Note that for  large enough:






Therefore, as  !1, we have from (5.9) that the necessary and sucient condition
for it to be always optimal to keep the unit in the last K stages approaches R  2C,
which is the same condition for it to be always optimal to keep the unit in the last
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two stages. Furthermore, as is readily veried from (4.10), if R < 2C and  ! 1
then it is always optimal to replace the unit at stage M   k, for all 2  k  M ,
i.e., the threshold line tends to the (1)-axis. Hence the DM becomes myopic in
the sense that, except for the last one, all decision epochs appear to be the same.
The DM appears to always face a two-stage decision process, the simplest one
possible; c.f. Remark 5.1. In the jargon of Whittle [WHI], it could be then said
that an innitely risk averse DM exhibits \neurotic" behavior, his optimal strategy
being of the \bang bang" type with respect to the parameter R: if R  2C, then
M k() = 0, and otherwise 

M k() = 1, for all 2  k M . This behavior can be
partly explained by noting that at most one change will then occur in the stream
of costs, thus achieving least variability in the cumulative cost.
Small Risk Aversion Case ( ! 0).
Next, we examine the question: How do the results in Theorems 4.1, 5.1-
5.2 compare to known results for the risk-neutral case? The answer is that
the risk-sensitive controller obtained here has as its small risk limit the known risk-
neutral controller, and both controllers have in general a similar structure. Similarly
as in [WCC], the dynamic programming equations for the risk-neutral case can be
written, with the conditional probability distribution of the state as the information
state. Then, it can be shown that the optimal risk-neutral controller has a structure
similar to the risk-sensitive controller given in Theorem 5.1. Furthermore, it can
be shown that the necessary and sucient condition in the risk-neutral case for the
separated policy M 1() = : : : = 

M K
() = 0 to be optimal is:





is obtained as the derivative with respect to , evaluated as  ! 0, of
(5.8). As can be easily veried, the above is nothing but the small risk limit (i.e.,
as  ! 0) of (5.9).
General Risk Aversion Case ( > 0).
The following result helps bring to light a manifestation of aversion to risk in
the DM; its proof is given in the Appendix.
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Lemma 5.3. Let  > 0, then for all k > 1:




Notice that the decision to replace a unit involves an uncertain, and therefore
a risky, investment in that the unit being replaced may actually be in working
condition, or it may subsequently fail. This is reected in (5.9), (5.12) and (5.13)
in that a risk neutral DM or controller may decide to replace a unit for values of R
higher than a risk averse DM or controller would not.
{20{
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 5.2:
Note that eC > 1 = 1. Proceeding by induction, suppose that e
kC > k.
Then, from (5.8), we have:
e(k+1)C = (1  )e(k+1)C + e(k+1)C
> (1  )ekC + ekC




Then the rst result follows since:





On the other hand, we have that
eRk = (1  )e
Rk + e
Rk




Proof of Theorem 5.2. It is instructive to rst perform a few steps of the dynamic
programming recursions of (5.3), which we proceed to do next. Recall (4.11), (5.2),
and (5.8) which will be used repeatedly.
STAGE k = 0.
J(;M) = (1) + (2): (A:4)
STAGE k = 1.
J(;M   1) = min
n
J0 (;M   1); J






J0 (;M   1) = (1  )(1) + (1) + e
C(2) = 1(1) + e
C(2);







Therefore, the region in IR2+ where it is optimal to keep the unit is dened by the
condition:
J0 (;M   1)  J

1 (;M   1)





















Since eC  eR and (i)  0; i = 1; 2, then (A.7) implies that it is always optimal
to keep the unit, i.e., M 1() = 0; 8 2 IR
2
+.
STAGE k = 2.
We have that J(;M   1) = J0 (;M   1). Therefore:





= 2(1) + e
2C(2);
(A:8:a)






Then the condition for it to be optimal to keep the unit is:
J0 (;M   2)  J

1 (;M   2)



















Therefore, using the results in Lemma 5.2, we conclude that it is always optimal
to keep the unit, i.e., M 2() = 0; 8 2 IR
2
+, if and only if R  2C. Otherwise,





(1) = (2): (A:10)
Thus the optimal policy is of the threshold type, such that it is optimal to keep the
unit for  values below and on the line determined by (A.10), and to replace the
unit otherwise.











and therefore: a) M 1() = : : : = 

M K+1
() = 0, and b) J(;M   K + 1) =

K 1(1) + e
(K 1)C(2). Thus, we have:
















Then, the condition for it to be optimal to keep the unit is:

























Thus, the necessary and sucient condition for it to be optimal to keep the unit for






If (A.13) is not satised, then the optimal policy will be of the threshold type, with
IR2+ being partitioned into keep and replace regions by a line, as dened by (5.11).
ut








(1  )l(k   1  l)C: (A:14:b)
Now, it also follows from (5.8) that:
kj=0 = 1; (A:14:c)
and therefore (A.14.a) is a convex combination of exponentials (the last term cor-





(1  )le(k 1 l)C + (1  )k 1

>
k 2X
l=0
(1  )lln
 
e(k 1 l)C

= 0k:
(A:15)
ut
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